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The Honorable Edward F. Hennessey*
With your permission, I should like to change the emphasis in this
discussion. Allow me to discuss some things that we can do to mini-
mize the trauma of ethical and disciplinary problems.
I'm not referring to the sweeping of ethical and disciplinary
problems under the rug. However, all speakers today have empha-
sized the necessity of doing everything valid that we can do to sustain
public confidence in the judiciary. We're all lost, the country's lost, if
we don't sustain that confidence. I am speaking of the many times
when the judiciary, the system and the individual judge, have suffered
needlessly. From these experiences we have learned of many things
that could have been done to mitigate unnecessary damage to the sys-
tem and to eliminate unnecessary suffering of the judge.
What have we learned? First and foremost, we have recognized
the need for mandatory and early education of judges as to the code of
judicial conduct, and as to ethical considerations for judges. There's
probably nothing more important and nothing more thoroughly ne-
glected. Some judges have never been aware of and have never had a
copy of the code, don't know where it's found in their court rules, and
have never read it. That is what leads some of them into trouble. I
think we'd all agree that most judges, a great majority of judges, don't
want to get into trouble, and they agonize when they do.
Second. We have found that bench and bar committees have been
helpful. Here knowledgeable members of the bar meet regularly with
presiding judges or committees of judges. Their purpose is to conduct
a candid and confidential dialogue as to problems in the administra-
tion of the courts. Among other things, dignified discussion should be
invited concerning the way judges do court business. Here, confidenti-
ality of the discussions is exceedingly important.
Third. Chief judges must be willing to act to keep foreseeable situ-
ations from escalating into disciplinary proceedings. A good chief
judge is not necessarily the most popular judge in the system. Troub-
lesome things can be foreseen in many instances, such as bias and fa-
voritism in the courtroom. That can even be detected in transcripts
sometimes. Overbearing attitudes in the courtroom, unhealthy as-
sociations in and outside the courthouse: those things frequently are
brought to the attention of the chief judge by bench-bar committees
and other responsible sources. If the chief doesn't act, bad habits of a
judge may blossom into an unnecessary disciplinary situation.
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Fourth. There must be openness and the appearance of openness
for the investigating and disciplinary process. I think ideally the disci-
plinary body, whether it's created by the Legislature or by the court,
should consist of lawyers, judges and nonlawyers. That in itself, par-
ticularly bringing members of the public in, gives actual openness and
the appearance of openness. That in turn builds public confidence.
However, should everything be open? I suggest definitely not. Most
complaints are groundless. Most of them are brought by somebody
who's upset or angry about a result in a court proceeding. The com-
plaints often have nothing to do with a breach of judicial ethics.
So the confidentiality of the complaint procedure should not be
open. You can't control the complainant and you can't control wit-
nesses for the complainant, but you can control the staff of the judicial
discipline group. You can by rule establish the rules of the judicial
discipline group, to the end that the confidentiality of groundless com-
plaints should be protected. But when does that cease to be a valid
principle? I suggest that when probable cause of a breach of judicial
ethics is established, the public is entitled to know, and promptly. It
hurts our image to have such a breach concealed for even a short time,
once probable cause is established. I add that, even if the complaint
was groundless, but the matter has become known to the news media
(perhaps from information supplied by the complainant) public disclo-
sure of the dismissal of that proceeding should be at the option of the
judge who was maligned by an improper complaint.
Fifth. I urge expedited proceedings. Delay in proceedings can do
no good, particularly if the matter is prematurely reported in the me-
dia. The longer a matter lingers, the greater the trauma upon the
system.
Sixth. I suggest, and this I suggest very strongly, judicial discipline
bodies should meet fairly regularly with groups of judges. The judge
groups should be of a manageable size for a meaningful dialogue. This
dialogue is not to be aimed at either group attempting to brainwash
the other. Rather, the purpose is to acquaint the disciplinary group
with the problems and questions of the judges, and to acquaint the
judges with the functions and the functioning of the disciplinary
group. The aim is to prevent an "us" and "them" atmosphere from
arising, and to promote cooperation. The cooperative effort is to keep
judges out of trouble with every valid available means.
Seventh. I think it's up to the supreme courts and presiding judges
and chief judges to establish policies and standards, so that, even aside
from the code, the judges understand what's expected from them on
such things as appointments of masters, and unhealthy associations.
To promote this understanding, I suggest that there must be a recog-
nized process, either formal or informal, for advice to judges. It
should be stated categorically that this advice does not bind the court
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(after all, it may be based on a hypothetical case) but it isn't fair to an
inquiring judge to leave him with no help at all for a decision he must
make.
Finally, there is the problem of drugs and alcohol, especially alco-
hol. Some people refer to us as an alcoholic society. That may or may
not be so, but the fact is that excessive drinking is a problem for a
small minority of judges. In my State we have avoided some serious
disciplinary problems by providing remedial support. In Massachu-
setts, and in some of your states, we have dedicated groups of lawyers
and judges who are the equivalent of Alcoholics Anonymous, and they
provide confidential support. They have saved many judges from seri-
ous difficulty under the ethical and disciplinary rules.
Let me conclude by making it clear that the disciplinary structure
must be designed to deal firmly and promptly with those rare in-
stances where a judge's conduct is corrupt or is otherwise wilful and
venal. Public confidence in the judiciary will be served by our clean-
ing our own house in that manner. What I have addressed in the last
several minutes are those complaints against judges which relate to
bad habits and poor judgment rather than venality. I have observed
with regret that most of these judicial failures are avoidable, and I
have suggested some valid ways which may eliminate their occur-
rence, and may mitigate their harmful effects when they do occur.
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